

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

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INFO USMISSION BERLIN

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 9244

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, RO, CH, CZ

SUBJ: COMMUNIST SUMMITRY IN THE SOVIET SCHEME OF
THINGS.

REF: MOSCOW 9120 AND 9124

1. SUMMARY: BREZHNEV/GROMYKO MEETING WITH EE AND
MONGOLIAN LEADERS IN CRIMEA (MOSCOW 9120) ILLUSTRATES
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THE INTERTWINING OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS:

MAINTAINING SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE "COMMONWEALTH" WHILE PURSUING DETENTE, FINDING A FORMULA FOR RELATIONS WITH THE EEC, COORDINATING THE LINE ON CSCE AND MBFR, AND COPING WITH THE CHINA PROBLEM. ON AT LEAST THE FIRST THREE OF THESE CONCERNS THE MEETING HAS PRODUCED EVIDENCE OF DIFFICULTIES -- MAINLY INVOLVING THE ROMANIANS. END SUMMARY.

2. IT IS NOT A TRUISM THAT ONE SIDE EFFECT OF BREZHNEV'S DETENTE POLICY IS ITS POTENTIAL FOR ADDING TO CENTRIFUGALISM IN EE. ONE SOVIET TECHNIQUE FOR COPING IS THE FORMULIZATION OF THE CRIMEAN VACATION CONFERENCE INTO AN APPARENTLY ANNUAL AFFAIR ("A GOOD TRADITION," ACCORDING TO THE AUGUST 2 PRAVDA LEADER).

3. WHILE ALL EE COUNTRIES, IN VARYING DEGREES, WILL REQUIRE MONITORING BY MOSCOW AS THEIR TIES WITH THE WEST PROLIFERATE, THE MOST VEXING PROBLEM FOR SOVIETS CONTINUES TO BE ROMANIA. THE PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS OF THE BREZHNEV-CEAUSESCU AUGUST 1 MEETING BEAR THIS OUT. UNLIKE THE REPORTING ON BREZHNEV BILATERALS WITH THE OTHER LEADERS ATTENDING THE CRIMEA MEETING, THE REPORT ON THE CEAUSESCU MEETING MADE NOT MENTION OF "FULL UNITY OF VIEWS," OF "FRATERNAL" RELATIONS, OR OF "ALL-AROUND" COOPERATION. THE ONLY OTHER DEPARTURE FROM THE STANDARD FORMAT WAS THE REPORT OF THE HUSAK MEETING, WHICH OMITTED "FULL" FROM THE "UNITY OF VIEWS." THE ROMANIAN MEETING -- UNLIKE THE OTHER SIX TALKS, WHICH WERE DESCRIBED VAGUELY AS DEALING WITH BILATERAL QUESTION -- GOT INTO CEMA INTEGRATION AS WELL AS BILATERAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

4. AS DETENTE PROCEEDS, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO FEEL THEMSELVES PUSHED TO NEW STEPS TO MINITOR GROWING EAST-WEST CONTACTS. THEIR EFFORT TO PROMOTE AN OFFICIAL CEMA-EEC RELATIONSHIP, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEMS TO PART DESIGNED TO HEAD OFF -- OR AT LEAST CONTROL -- BILATERAL EE CONTACTS WITH THE COMMON MARKET. IN THE CRIMEA CEAUSESCU MAY WELL HAVE TOLD BREZHNEV WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE IDEA. IZVESTIA LEADER AUGUST 2 SEEMED TO BE CONFIDENTIAL

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RESPONDING TO EE SENSITIVITIES TOWARD THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP. IT SAID THAT "INTEGRATION IN NO SENSE ISOLATES SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FROM THE GENERAL WORLD PROCESS OF BROADENING ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL COOPERATION."

5. IN DESCRIBING THE MULTILATERAL CRIMEA MEETING, THE SOVIET PRESS HAS GIVEN HEAVY PLAY TO THE COORDINATION

THEME. THE AUGUST 2 PRAVDA LEADER, FOR EXAMPLE, EMPHASIZED AN "AGREED LINE" AND "JOINTLY ELABORATED FOREIGN POLICY MOVES." THIS CONTRASTS WITH THE CRIMEA COMMUNIQUE REFERENCE, WHICH WAS LIMITED -- PRE-SUMABLY REFLECTING ROMANIAN SENSITIVITIES -- TO MERE "COORDINATION OF ACTIVITY." WORTH NOTING THAT ROMANIAN DIPLOMATS HERE, WHILE DISCLAIMING ANY INFORMATION ABOUT CRIMEA, OBJECT TO CALLING THE DOCUMENT ISSUED THEREFROM A "COMMUNIQUE," SINCE THEIR EXPERIENCE IS THAT HOSTS MERELY OFFER THE GUESTS A PREPARED PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AND ASK IF ANYONE OBJECTS.

6. THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMEA COMMUNIQUE TO TAKE UP CSCE BASKET ONE ITEMS, WHILE DEALING WITH BASKETS TWO AND THREE, MAY REFLECT DIFFICULTIES -- AGAIN INVOLVING THE ROMANIANS -- OVER THE FORMULATION ON RENUNCIATION OF FORCE. (ROMANIANS HERE AFFIRM THAT THEY WILL BE MAKING PROPOSAL ON THIS SUBJECT AT GENEVA.)

7. WHILE CHINA WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE COMMUNIQUE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, WE DOUBT THAT THE SUBJECT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. CONSIDERING THE HULLABALLOO TWO YEARS AGO, WHEN THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE WITHOUT ROMANIAN ATTENDANCE AND AGAINST A BACKDROP OF REPORTED PRESSURE ON ROMANIA AND YUGOSLOAVIA BECAUSE OF THEIR TIES WITH CHINA, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO HAVE GONE FAR INDEFUSING THE CHINA ISSUE. MOREOVER, THE RETURN FROM PEKING ON CONSULTATIONS OF BORDER NEGOTIATOR ILICHEV AND THE SIGNATURE OF SINO-SOVIET AIR AND TRADE AGREEMENTS CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF MOVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. THUS THE NATURE OF DISCUSSION ON CHINA IS NOT CLEAR. BUT IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO CONFIDENTIAL

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HINT AT THE NEED FOR ANOTHER WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE.

8. AS THE SOVIETS MOVE INTO AUTUMN ROUNDS OF MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL EAST-WEST DEALINGS, IT WILL BE ONE OF THEIR PRIME CONCERNS TO KEEP THEIR ALLIES IN LINE. THIS MAY NOT BE EASY. EAST EUROPEANS ARE ADEPT AT FINDING IN SOVIET RHETORIC THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PURSUING THEIR OWN INTERESTS. MOREOVER, THE CURRENT SOVIET EFFORT AT HOME TO ERASE THE DEVIL IMAGE OF THE US (WITNESS THEIR HANDLING OF THE AUGUST 1 MOON ROCK PRESENTATION TO PODGORNYY - MOSCOW 9124) NECESSARILY CUTS ACROSS THE CONTINUING EXHORTATIONS FOR "VIGILANCE" AGAINST UNNAMED DARK FORCES AND UNDERCUTS THE APPEALS FOR SOCIALIST UNITY AGAINST THE COMBINED --

BUT UNNAMED -- FORCES OF IMPERIALISM.
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